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“Rape is unique. No other violent crime is so fraught with controversy, so
enmeshed in dispute and in the politics of gender and sexuality.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Two freshmen get ready for an exciting Saturday night at their new college.2
The man, John, started drinking earlier in the day as part of a freshman initiation.

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2017; B.A.,
Political Science, California State University, Chico, 2013. I want to extend my deepest thanks to Distinguished
Professor Michael Vitiello for his ubiquitous guidance in this Comment and in my legal education. I also want
to thank the Board of Editors of Volume 47 & 48 of The University of the Pacific Law Review—you have all
taught me so much and will always be an inspiration to me. Last, but not least, I thank my best friend Chloe for
always being my rock.
1. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA (Penguin Random House, 2015) (quoting DAVID LISAK, LORI GARDINIER,
SARAH C. NICKSA & ASHLEY M. COTE, FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN (2010)).
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The bonding ritual involved consuming large amounts of alcohol, resulting in
stumbling and slurred words. Later describing his intoxication, John said it was,
“the drunkest [he had] ever been.”3
The woman, Jane, took shots of vodka and drank numerous screwdrivers in
her friend’s dorm room in an effort to get rid of the previous night’s hangover.4
The drinks led to her falling down. A friend then helped her back to her dorm
room, which was in John’s building.5 While heading to her room, Jane met
John’s roommate and she followed him to John’s room.6 Soon enough, John and
Jane were engaged in what observers described as “something sexual.”7 Jane’s
friends took her home before anything further occurred, but not until after Jane
gave John her number.8
John and Jane later met up at the campus quad where they had sex that same
night.9 A couple walking through the quad spotted them and notified campus
security and police. John was then arrested and charged with rape.10 The next
morning, John and Jane had little memory of the events.11
The night of their sexual encounter, John and Jane both had blood alcohol
levels above the legal limit, and possibly, far above the legal limit.12 Like the
example of John and Jane’s, circumstances in which both participants are
intoxicated and engage in sexual intercourse are more prevalent on college

2. The following hypothetical is a compilation of the facts from a civil case, the events of which occurred
at Occidental College, and a criminal case from Davis, CA. See Richard Dorment, Occidental Justice: The
Disastrous Fallout When Drunk Sex Meets Academic Bureaucracy, ESQUIRE (Mar. 25, 2015), available at
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a33751/occidental-justice-case/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (discussing a civil action from Occidental College between two freshman students who
had a drunken sexual encounter, and the male was subsequently expelled); Lauren Keene, Jury acquits Davis
man of rape charges, THE DAVIS ENTERPRISE (Feb. 3, 2013), available at http://www.davisenterprise.com/
local-news/crime-fire-courts/jury-acquits-davis-man-of-rape-charges/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (discussing the acquittal of a 21-year-old Davis man charged with rape after witnesses saw him
having sex with a woman near the Amtrak station when both he and the woman had .23 and .17 BAC levels,
respectively).
3. Dorment, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Keene, supra note 2 (discussing the acquittal of a 21-year-old Davis man charged with rape after
witnesses saw him having sex with a woman near the Amtrak station when both he and the woman had 0.23 and
0.17 BAC levels, respectively).
11. Dorment, supra note 2.
12. See id. (discussing that while the parties’ blood-alcohol levels were unknown, both had little-to-no
memory of the sexual encounter); see also Keene, supra note 2 (discussing how the man’s and woman’s bloodalcohol content was 0.17 and 0.23, respectively).
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campuses now than in the past.13 This raises the question of how the criminal law
deals with situations where both the male and female are heavily intoxicated and
engage in sexual intercourse but only one is accused of sexual assault.
Statutes and social attitudes regarding rape have changed throughout our
nation’s history.14 In contrast, the relevance of intoxication as a defense to rape
has not changed.15 Adopted in 1962, Section 2.08 of the Model Penal Code
(MPC) established the long-standing law of intoxication as a defense.16 But at
least some members of the American Law Institute (ALI) believe that the
relevance of intoxication as a defense to rape should change.17
In a movement to alter the law, the ALI constructed a new tentative draft for
the MPC that eliminates Section 2.08 applicability to the Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses provisions.18 This proposed change would be a drastic shift in
the law of intoxication and rape.19 This Comment argues that the ALI should
adopt this proposed rule because it will level the disparity of consequences for
voluntary intoxication between the sexes and make them equal under the law,
leading to fewer injustices in the now prevalent occurrence of mutually
intoxicated sexual intercourse on college campuses.20
Part II of this Comment provides background information on the traditional
law of intoxication and then on the related provisions of the 1962 MPC.21 It will
also examine how John could be criminally prosecuted under current law.22 Part
II then discusses the MPC’s proposed changes to Section 2.08 and its effect on
the Sexual Assault and Related Offenses provisions, Sections 213.1 through
213.8.23
Part III discusses the practical implications of the proposed changes in the
law, both generally and in cases of mutually intoxicated sexual intercourse on
college campuses.24 Eliminating § 2.08 would alter the principle of culpability,
and Part III examines why intoxication should be viewed significantly as it is in
the proposed draft by explaining the prevalence of college-aged drinking and the

13. SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUSES: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. 2 (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 567–74 (Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc., 6th ed. 2012) (discussing changes from traditional to reform rape statutes and changes from the original
perspective to the modern perspective regarding rape).
15. Id. at 568.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
17. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 568.
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
19. Id.
20. Infra Part IV.
21. Infra Part II.
22. Infra Part II.
23. Infra Part II.
24. Infra Part III.
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effects of alcohol on the mental processes.25 Lastly, Part III poses questions
concerning the effectiveness of the proposed changes, the challenges the
proposals present, and the remaining gaps in this area of the law.26 Part IV
concludes that the proposed changes, if adopted, would produce fairer results and
would rightfully address the issue of mutually intoxicated sexual assault.27
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Traditional Approach to Intoxication
The use of intoxication as a defense has been quite limited in our nation’s
history.28 The early common law provided zero forgiveness for an intoxicated
offender, regardless of whether the intoxication was gross or minimal.29 Some
commentators, including Blackstone, argued that intoxication was an aggravating
circumstance.30 However, efforts to make intoxication an aggravating
circumstance were unfruitful until the supporters of the prevailing rules exhibited
doubts about the strictness of the current law.31 The supporters’ ideological
changes radically modified the law in the nineteenth century, which relaxed the
rules towards a “more humane direction.”32
An 1819 murder case first suggested that voluntary intoxication might
demonstrate a lack of premeditation, but could not be a complete defense.33 In
Montana v. Egelhoff, Justice Scalia stated that during the nineteenth century
“courts carved out an exception to the common law’s traditional across-the-board
condemnation of the drunken offender, allowing a jury to consider a defendant’s
intoxication when assessing whether he possessed the mental state needed to
commit the crime charged, where the crime was one requiring a ‘specific
intent,’” but not when charged with a general intent crime.34 If the distinction is
sound, Chief Justice Traynor stated in People v. Hood that:
[A] drunk man is capable of forming intent to do something simple, such
as strike another, unless he is so drunk that he has reached the stage of
unconsciousness. What he is not capable as a sober man of doing is

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part IV.
Jerome Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1944).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46 (1996).
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exercising judgment about the social consequences of his acts or
controlling his impulses toward anti-social acts.35
General intent refers to any offense in which the only mens rea required is a
blameworthy state of mind, while specific intent refers to an offense that
expressly requires proof of the explicit mental state.36 Therefore, a drunk man is
capable of forming the mental state required for a general intent crime such as
battery, but may not be capable of forming the mental state required for common
law burglary, which requires the specific intent of “intent to commit a felony
therein.”37
The exception most importantly impacted murder charges.38 A sufficiently
intoxicated offender might be spared the death penalty because intoxication
prevented him from forming the requisite mens rea for first-degree murder.39
Regarding rape or sexual assault, however, an offender’s intoxication provided
no defense.40 Rape, as defined at common law, was a general intent offense.41 As
a result, evidence of the offender’s intoxication was irrelevant and, therefore,
inadmissible.42
The historic hesitation to allow an offender to rely on evidence of
intoxication as a defense is easy to understand.43 One of the main concerns was
“the easiness of counterfeiting the disability.”44 Additionally, permitting
intoxication as a defense was imprudent because statistics showed that
intoxication caused most homicides and other crimes.45 Lastly, intoxication could
be used as a shield for avoiding responsibility.46
Despite strong concerns about allowing an intoxication defense, scholars
pointed out the injustices that may result from the traditional view on alcohol.47

35. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 458 (1969).
36. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 138.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. See Hall, supra note 28, at 1051 (discussing the impact of the exception on various crimes).
39. Id. For the remainder of the Comment, I will use “he” to describe an offender. Statistics show that
males are the predominant perpetrators of rape and sexual assault. See Sexual Assault Statistics, ONE IN FOUR
(last visited July 15, 2016), available at http://www.oneinfourusa.org/statistics.php (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
40. See id. at 1061–66 (distinguishing between the use of the exculpatory doctrine in specific intent
crimes versus general intent crimes).
41. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 567.
42. Id. at 322.
43. Hall, supra note 28, at 1047 (quoting HALE, HISTORY OF THE CROWN 32 (1736)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 352 (1985).
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This created a dichotomy of views that the drafters of the 1962 MPC had to
address.48
B. The 1962 Model Penal Code
Criminal law is premised on the notion that one should only be held
criminally responsible for the harm that he causes.49 A person can only cause the
harm and be convicted of an offense when he has the requisite mens rea.50 As
scholar Sanford H. Kadish noted, “it is deeply rooted in our moral sense of
fitness that punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may not
justly be imposed where the person is not blameworthy.”51 The mens rea,
therefore, relates to blame.52 For example, a defendant can cause harm without
having a culpable mental state (e.g., John in the hypothetical).53
The drafters of the 1962 MPC followed this basic principle of criminal law in
implementing Section 2.02, which states, “unless some element of mental
culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no
valid criminal conviction may be obtained.”54 The MPC abandoned the common
law distinction between general and specific intent crimes and replaced it with
four terms of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.55 If a
statute does not include the culpability required to establish a material element,
then that element is established if, at a minimum, the person acted recklessly.56
The MPC states that a person acts recklessly if “he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct.”57
Intoxicated actors create difficulty in the mens rea analysis because
intoxicants distort judgment by reducing the actor’s ability to control his feelings,
impulses, and conduct, leading to an inability to form intent.58 The MPC permits
actors to use intoxication as a defense in two circumstances:59 if the actor’s

48.
defense).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
2012).
56.
57.
58.
59.
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See id. (discussing opponent’s view of the concept that intoxication should not be considered as a
DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 3.
Id. at 117.
Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (1980).
DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 3.
Supra Part I (discussing the John and Jane hypothetical).
MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02 cmt. at 229 (1985).
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 160 (Thompson Reuters, 6th ed.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 317.
Id. at 330.
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intoxication is severe enough to negate an element of the offense60 or if the
intoxication was not self-induced.61
Section 2.08 lays out these two exceptions for when a person faces
prosecution for a crime that requires recklessness to establish criminal liability.62
Section 2.08 states that if a person “due to self-induced intoxication is unaware of
a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness
is immaterial.”63 Therefore, when the offense requires recklessness, the law
irrefutably presumes that an actor has the requisite mens rea when he is
voluntarily intoxicated.64 This, in effect, equates the actor’s decision to get drunk
with the particular risk that he took (e.g., that he would engage in sexual
intercourse without consent—two acts that do not obviously go hand in hand).65
The MPC tackles this issue head-on in its comments and provides its
justifications for the adoption of Section 2.08.66 The commentary balances the
social value of intoxication against the potential dangers and difficulties of
litigating an intoxicated actor’s state of mind.67 The commentary’s decision relies
on its finding that, “Drunkenness usually does import recklessness, and, anyhow,
it creates difficulties of proof to allow the issue to be litigated.”68 The MPC
further justifies its position by stating that it is fair to equate the risk of becoming
drunk with the risk of committing a crime is fair because the risks of excessive
drinking are now so prevalent in society that everyone is aware of them.69
What does this mean for John? John was aware of the risks created by his
conduct while intoxicated, and is presumed reckless under the MPC.70 This
presumption has monumental effects for an eighteen-year-old accused of rape.71

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 330–31.
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985).
64. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 331.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985).
66. Id. at 352.
67. Id. at 359.
Becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor’s powers of perception and of judgment is conduct
which plainly has no affirmative social value to counterbalance the potential danger. . . . Added to this are the
impressive difficulties posed in litigating the foresight of any particular actor at the time when he imbibes and
the relative rarity of cases where intoxication really does engender unawareness as distinguished from
imprudence.
Id.
68. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 600 (1963) (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 3 at 8–9 (AM. LAW INST., Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)).
69. MODEL PENAL CODE, Comment to § 2.08, at 359 (1985). (“Awareness of the potential consequences
of excessive drinking on the capacity of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so
dispersed in our culture that it is not unfair to postulate a general equivalence between the risks created by the
conduct of the drunken actor and the risks created by his conduct in becoming drunk.”). Id.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985).
71. Id.
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Assume that John is charged with rape. Traditionally, the law defined rape as
a male engaging in sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her
consent.72 After a wave of reform, many states now divide the offense into
degrees and redefine the offense in gender-neutral terms.73 Several states,
including New York, adopted statutes based on the MPC.74 New York law states
that a person is guilty of rape in the first degree if he “engages in sexual
intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion; or who is incapable of
consent by reason of being physically helpless; or who is less than eleven years
old; or who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years old or
more.”75
Similar to the MPC, New York’s rape statute does not specify a mens rea
requirement.76 As a result, under Section 2.02(3), a court would read in the mens
rea term of recklessness.77 Under Section 2.08, John is presumed reckless
because of his voluntary intoxication and, thus, would be guilty of first-degree
rape if the actus reus, voluntary act, is proven.78 Therefore, although John was
not aware of how his intoxication would affect his conduct, the MPC sacrifices
his “rare” circumstance for the perceived benefit in avoiding the difficulty in
litigating a particular offender’s unawareness.79 The result of this sacrifice is that
John could face 1.5 to 25 years imprisonment, registration as a sex offender for
20 years to life, and required treatment either in jail or prison.80
The offender’s unawareness could take various forms. For example, John
may have been intoxicated but still understood that Jane did not consent, in
which case he would not have a defense.81 Or, John may have been so drunk that
he did not recognize that Jane was too drunk to give consent.82 Another
possibility is that John never consumed that much alcohol before and was
unaware of its effects; he might not have understood that consuming that much

72. DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 568.
73. Id.
74. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 3
(Mar. 12, 1999), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf (on file with The
University of Pacific Law Review).
75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (2001).
76. See id. (defining rape in the first degree).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985).
78. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985); DRESSLER, supra note 14, at 85.
79. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985) (describing the rationale for adopting the rule in
order to avoid difficulties in litigating the foresight of a particular actor engaging in voluntary intoxication).
80. New York Sexual Assault Laws, FINDLAW (last visited July 15, 2016), http://statelaws.findlaw.com/
new-york-law/new-york-sexual-assault-laws.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review);
FAQ, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES (last visited July 15, 2016), http://www.criminaljustice.
ny.gov/nsor/faq.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 at 358–59 (1985) (comparing the state of mind required in other
crimes, such as burglary, to show the impact of intoxication in determining an accused’s state of mind).
82. Infra Part III.A.2.b.
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alcohol would cause him to participate in harmful sexual behavior.83 In its current
form, the MPC does not allow for considerations of these subtle distinctions
between the offender’s unawareness; the offender is both intoxicated and
reckless, or he is not.84
The law further protects the female and her mental state, which exacerbates
the injustice John faces when he is denied the opportunity to rebut his presumed
recklessness.85 Under New York law, a person is guilty of second-degree rape
“when ‘being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse
with another person less than fifteen years old; or . . . with another person who is
incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally
incapacitated.’”86
Jane is protected by the language “mentally incapacitated.”87 Jane’s
intoxication legally renders her mentally incapacitated and shielded by the law,
while John’s intoxication subjects him to criminal liability and punishment.88
Regardless of the fact that Jane and John were mutually and, arguably, equally
intoxicated, the law protects Jane and condemns John.89 Consequently, the MPC
and those states that adopt similar provisions contribute to a gender imbalance in
cases that prosecute only one side of a double-sided intoxication.90
C. The Model Penal Code’s Proposed Changes
The ALI is currently amending the MPC’s provisions on Sexual Assault and
Related Offenses.91 In the current proposal, Section 213.0(4) states, “the
provisions of Model Penal Code Section 2.08(2) shall not apply to this Article.”92
The “Article” mentioned is Article 213, which is the Sexual Assault and Related
Offenses provision.93
The proposed draft, in effect, rejects the premise that an offender is
automatically reckless because he became voluntarily intoxicated.94 Instead, it
would require that liability for the offenses in Sections 213.1 through 213.8 be
proven by evidence of the offender’s actual subjective awareness for each

83. Id.
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
85. See id.
86. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (2001).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See generally, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (2001).
91. Model Penal Code, THE AM. L. INST. (last visited Jan 4, 2016), https://www.ali.org/publications/
show/model-penal-code/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) at 1 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
93. Id.
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, 2015).
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material element.95 If the offender lacks the subjective awareness required for the
material element, i.e. due to voluntary intoxication, he cannot be held liable.96
The drafters explain the change by referencing a situation similar to John and
Jane’s situation.97 They pose a hypothetical in which a college student at a
fraternity party drinks a couple of beers and then a shot of whiskey.98 In the
process of swallowing the whiskey, he is surely aware of the substantial risk of
becoming intoxicated, and also surely aware of the substantial risk that he could
engage in typical drunken behavior such as falling down, running into objects,
shouting, or even breaking items.99 However, unlike the current version of
Section 2.08, the proposed draft does not equate the college student’s awareness
of consuming whiskey with the awareness of a substantial risk that he will
commit rape.100
While the proposed draft eliminates Section 2.08’s application to the Sexual
Assault and Related Offenses provisions, it keeps the protection for victims who
are “incapable of expressing unwillingness due to intoxication” intact.101 The
draft justifies retaining this safeguard because voluntary intoxication should not
be equated with a victim waiving his or her right to “autonomous choice and
bodily integrity.”102
However, the draft also acknowledges two things: (1) college-aged victims
often are assaulted by people they know; and (2) in those circumstances,
“[t]ypically the victim has not been duped but rather has voluntarily chosen to
drink.”103 While voluntary intoxication does not waive bodily integrity and does
not constitute consent in itself, the draft states that voluntary intoxication also
does not preclude a person from giving consent.104 The draft does not permit an
offender to set out to purposely intoxicate a victim, become intoxicated himself,
and then use intoxication as a defense.105 For instance, if John purposely got Jane
drunk, and then had sex with her, he would not be able to use his intoxication as
a defense.
Generally, date-rape drug cases would come out the same under the current
law and the proposed law because the offender’s mens rea existed before he got
intoxicated; he purposely set out to intoxicate the victim in order to commit the
offense and cannot claim he failed to appreciate the victim’s mental state.106 In
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 189.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(2)(c) cmt. at 85 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
102. Id. at 86.
103. Id. at 85–86.
104. Id. at 86.
105. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
106. Id. at 189.
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these situations, the prosecution could still prove that the accused was aware of
the victim’s inability to consent because of his actions prior to his intoxicated
state.107
The recent case at Stanford University provides a good example of how a
prosecutor might still gain a conviction even in an instance in which the offender
has been drinking.108 In early January 2015, witnesses observed Stanford student
Brock Turner standing over an unconscious female lying on the ground next to a
dumpster.109 In responding to a sexual assault claim against him, Turner later told
police that he left a fraternity house with the victim.110 Turner stated that he and
the victim then kissed and ended up on the ground where he digitally penetrated
her for five minutes, but he did not remove his pants or expose his penis.111
Turner smelled of alcohol when he was handcuffed and doctors stated the victim
had an estimated blood alcohol concentration of .22% at the time of the
assault.112 Despite having consumed “about seven cans of Rolling Rock beer and
a couple of swigs of Fireball,” Turner admitted that he remembered everything
that happened and that he consciously decided to engage in sexual activity with
the victim.113 Thus, even though he was intoxicated, Turner did not claim such
mental impairment that he failed to realize what he was doing.114 Additionally,
the prosecutor could rebut any claim of lack of familiarity with the effects of
drugs and alcohol by reference to Turner’s prior experience demonstrating his
familiarity with drugs and alcohol.115
Overall, the draft presents an innovative approach to rape prosecutions by
recognizing that a standard that penalizes any sexual activity with an intoxicated
individual is inappropriate.116 If adopted, the proposal permits admitting evidence
of both the victim’s and the accused’s mental state.117 Consequently, if John were
charged with rape, he would have the opportunity to introduce evidence of his, as
well as Jane’s, intoxication in order to disprove his subjective awareness.118
Although the protection of victims under the law remains largely the same, the

107. Id. at 190.
108. See Ray Sanchez, Stanford Rape Case: Inside the Court Documents, CNN (June 11, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/10/us/stanford-rape-case-court-documents/ (discussing the court documents in the
case involving Brock Turner).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Felony Complaint Case Summary, People v. Turner, No. 15-018-0019U, PR 029 (2015),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1532973/complaint-brock-turner.pdf (on file with The University
of Pacific Law Review)
114. Id.
115. Sanchez, supra note 108.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
117. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(2)(c) cmt. at 86 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
118. Id.
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progressive recommendations in the mens rea requirement provide more equal
protection for John and Jane, two equal participants in a drunken sexual
encounter.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE
This section addresses what could occur if the ALI adopts the tentative draft
and its changes.119
A. How the Proposed Change Will Improve on the Current Code
The proposed change will improve upon the current code by leveling
culpability and liability,120 by accommodating mutually intoxicated sexual assault
scenarios,121 and by eliminating gender-biased protection.122
1. Culpability
One reason for adopting the proposed rule lies in the basic meaning of mens
rea in criminal law: culpability.123 Prominent criminal law scholar Glanville
Williams, among other scholars, pointed out the injustice that would result from
the MPC’s original stance on intoxication.124 Williams observed, “if a man is
punished for doing something when drunk that he would not have done when
sober, is he not in plain truth punished for getting drunk?”125
While allowing intoxication to rebut the mens rea of purpose or knowledge,
the MPC does not allow the same rebuttal for the mens rea of recklessness or
negligence.126 If the mens rea required is recklessness or negligence, the MPC
comments state that a situation involving either of these mens rea raises “no
problem of importance in the ordinary case where drink . . . induced a temporary
change in personality, impairing judgment or reducing inhibition or control.”127
Drunkenness, the MPC commentary claims, is not “logically relevant to the
existence or nonexistence of any element of the offense and, if all elements of the
offense are established, conviction should follow in spite of intoxication.”128
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Not only is considering intoxication in offenses requiring recklessness or
negligence logically irrelevant in the current MPC but it is also consistent with
the position taken in the common law.129 The common law regards intoxication
as a “simple infirmity of impaired control,” which offers “no stronger a basis for
formal adjustments in the grading offenses or for complete exculpation than do
infirmities produced by a variety of other causes.”130
The members of the Advisory Committee for the 1962 MPC did not
unanimously agree on isolating “recklessness” as a mens rea element irrefutable
by evidence of intoxication.131 Judge Learned Hand and other members saw no
significant reason for carving out this special rule.132 Judge Hand was of the view
that if, as defined in Section 2.02(2)(c), recklessness requires that a person
“consciously disregard a risk,”133 then evidence of severe drunkenness should be
permitted to negate the actor’s consciousness of the risk.134 Since awareness of
the risk is the root of moral culpability, when that awareness is absent the result
is a liability much higher than the degree of culpability.135
Although opponents of the current MPC stance, including Williams and
Judge Hand, urged to eliminate any special rule and instead advocated that the
law should require proving what the actor foresaw at the time of alcohol
consumption, the MPC ultimately adopted the special rule.136 This special rule
placed John, and those similarly situated to him, in an unjust position. Offenders
who did not have the ability to form intent presumably reject the notion that
severe intoxication is legally irrelevant. They presumably reject the notion that
they were consciously aware of the result that consuming alcohol would have on
them and their actions. Lastly, they surely reject the notion that their intoxication
automatically establishes their mens rea. All of these notions lend to a liability
disproportionate to culpability.137
Adopting the proposed change in the MPC draft would remedy the
disproportion between liability and culpability.138 As noted in the draft’s
commentary, assuming that John, who was most likely aware of the substantial
risk of becoming drunk since it was not his first time drinking, was also aware of
a substantial risk that he would commit rape is illogical.139 A college student like
John may have been consciously aware that taking shots would result in a change
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in his behavior and loss in bodily control, but his moral choice in consuming
alcohol is not the equivalent of the moral choice he makes when he commits a
crime.140
By removing Section 2.08 as applied to Sections 213.0 through 213.11, the
proposed draft treats John’s awareness of becoming drunk and awareness of
committing rape as separate concepts; he is only liable if there is proof of his
culpability.141 The draft eliminates the disproportion because if John’s culpability
were proven, he would receive the appropriate liability; conversely, if his
culpability were not proven, he would not be liable.142
Additionally, Section 2.08 is contrary to the MPC’s structure.143 The MPC
rests on the principle that specific levels of fault are attributed to each element of
an offense.144 Yet, it carved out a special rule for intoxication by using a
balancing analysis, thus thwarting its own fundamental concept.145 Adopting the
proposed change would eliminate this anomaly and restore the MPC to its
doctrine of proportional liability to culpability.146 In addition to leveling
culpability and liability, the proposed change will also accommodate mutually
intoxicated sexual assault scenarios.147
2. Accommodation for Mutually Intoxicated Sexual Assault Scenarios
The law should accommodate mutually intoxicated sexual assault scenarios
because of the prevalence of college-aged drinking148 and because of the serious
effects of alcohol on the mental processes.149
a. Prevalence of College-Aged Drinking
The proposed changes to the MPC focusing on intoxication may lead one to
wonder why the drafters are altering the law in this area now? Referring to the
140. Id.
141. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015)
(discussing how an “aggressor, as a result of intoxication, fails to appreciate that the complainant’s mental state
is compromised, the subsequent activity is not fairly labeled criminal on the basis of those circumstances
alone”).
142. See id. at 190 (discussing the application of the mens rea standard in Article 213 “that defines in
specific, concrete terms the facts that will be sufficient to establish nonconsent or absence of positive
consent.”).
143. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 188 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
144. Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doctrine from
Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 698 (2002–2003) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
145. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985).
146. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 188 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
147. Id. at 190.
148. Infra Part III.A.2.a.
149. Infra Part III.A.2.b.
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hypothetical about the college student posed in the commentary to Section 2.08,
it suggests that an ordinary self-induced intoxicated actor now raises a “problem
of importance.”150
When the accused is an alcoholic, the 1962 Code commentary refers to cases
where courts mitigated prison terms and allowed discussion of the accused’s
intoxication for crimes, such as being drunk in public.151 While the Code
recognizes alcoholic offenders as a class that deserves special treatment, it does
not recognize heavy social drinkers as a class that should receive special
treatment under the criminal law.152
At the same time, the Code commentary states that the consequences of
excessive drinking are so plain that claiming ignorance should not preclude
deeming an offender criminally reckless.153 While claiming the consequences are
known to all society, the Code comments do not appreciate the societal norm of
excessive drinking, especially among college-aged people.154
Alcohol-related problems on college campuses are now a major public
concern.155 Drinking settings include fraternity parties, athletic events, residence
halls, off-campus housing areas with a high-proportion of students, and offcampus bars.156 The National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
(NIAAA) was founded about 40 years ago on the premise that alcoholism was an
adult disease.157 With more research, data, and insights, the NIAAA increased its
focus on young adult and underage drinking.158
Through national, large-scale surveys conducted over 20 years, data indicates
that alcohol dependence is highest among ages 18–20 and second highest among

150. But see MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 351 (1985) (stating that a self-induced intoxicated actor
“raises no problem of importance in the ordinary case where drink . . . have at most induced a temporary change
in personality, impairing judgment or reducing inhibition and control.”).
151. See id. at 352 n.6 (1985) (citing People v. Walcher, 42 Ill.2d 159, 246 N.E.2d 256 (1969), where the
Supreme Court of Illinois considered that the offender was an alcoholic in evaluating the circumstances of the
crime); Id. at 355 n.15 (1985) (citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
which was based in part on the decision in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
152. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.08 cmt. at 350–56 (1985) (discussing heavily intoxicated
actors and deciding the minimal significance of ordinary self-induced intoxicated actors in the criminal
context).
153. Id. at 359.
154. See generally id. at 159 (acknowledging the widespread knowledge of the consequences of excessive
drinking, while not directly addressing how widespread excessive drinking is in society).
155. Kathryn Stewart, Facts and Myths About College Drinking: A Serious Problem with Serious
Solutions, PREVENTION RESOURCE CTR. 1 (May 2013), available at http://resources.prev.org/documents/Facts
MythsCollegeDrinking.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
156. Id.
157. Michael Windle & Robert A. Zucker, Reducing Underage and Young Adult Drinking: How to
Address Critical Drinking Problems During This Developmental Period, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, (June 30, 2016), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh40/29-44.htm (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
158. Id.

437

2017 / The Model Penal Code’s New Approach to Rape and Intoxication
ages 21–24.159 Over time, the NIAAA found that college drinking is “extremely
widespread.”160 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found
that people ages 18–24 have the highest prevalence of binge drinking at 28.2
percent, and that age group also drinks the most excessively, consuming an
average of “9.3 drinks on occasion.”161
The NIAAA found that four out of five college students drink alcohol.162
One-half of those students binge drink.163 The NIAAA defines binge drinking as
“a pattern of drinking that brings blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels to
0.08 g/dL. This typically occurs after 4 drinks for women and 5 drinks for men—
in about 2 hours.”164 One step below binge drinking is heavy drinking, which
constitutes drinking “5 or more drinks on the same occasion on each of 5 or more
days in the past 30 days.”165 A step below heavy drinking is moderate alcohol
consumption, which is considered consuming one drink per day as a woman and
up to two drinks per day as a man.166 Therefore, according to the NIAAA, onehalf of the female college students who drink alcohol consume four drinks in two
hours, and one-half of the male college students consume five drinks in two
hours.167 So, why does this matter?
The problem with binge-drinking is that college students experience a
multitude of adverse consequences, whether they participate in the drinking or
not.168 These consequences include health problems, injury, death, academic
problems, assault, and sexual abuse.169 A 2001 Harvard study examining the
secondhand effects of alcohol among underage students found the following
effects, among others: insults/humiliation, serious arguments/quarrels, property
damage, pushing, hitting/assaults, unwanted sexual advances, and sexual assault
or date rape.170

159. Id.
160. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM (Jan. 2, 2016), available at
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/special-populations-co-occurring-disorders/college-drinking (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
161. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, VITAL SIGNS: BINGE DRINKING PREVALENCE,
FREQUENCY, AND INTENSITY AMONG ADULTS—UNITED STATES, 2010, MORBIDITY AND MORALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 61(1), 14–19 (Jan. 30, 2016), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/
mm6101a4.htm?s_cid=mm6101a4_w (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
162. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160.
163. Id.
164. Drinking Levels Defined, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM (Jan. 2, 2016),
available at, http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/moderate-binge-drinking
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Henry Wechsler et al., Underage College Students’ Drinking Behavior, Access to Alcohol, and the
Influence of Deterrence Policies, 50 J. OF AM. C. HEALTH 223, 228 (2002).
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Included in a variety of the studies is the consequence of sexual assault.171
The NIAAA states that more than 97,000 students between the ages of 18–24 are
victims of alcohol-related sexual assault.172 Other college student surveys found
that approximately 50 percent of college women have been sexually assaulted.173
Data from other studies show that around three percent of college women are
victims of rape, which translates into nearly 35 allegations or instances of rape
out of every 1,000 female students.174 However, women are not the only
victims.175 Other studies show that one percent of male students also reported
experiencing attempted sexual penetration without their consent.176
Statistics on this subject are not comprehensive because sexual assaults are
often unreported.177 However, statistics are consistent in stating that at least 50
percent of sexual assaults are associated with alcohol use.178 Additionally, when
alcohol is consumed before a sexual assault, it is usually consumed by both
parties.179 Out of the alcohol-related sexual assaults that are reported, both parties
consumed alcohol roughly 81 percent of the time.180 Another study discovered
even more staggering numbers181—it found that 55 percent of the sexual assaults
reported by college women involved alcohol, and in 97 percent of those assaults,
both the victim and the perpetrator consumed alcohol.182
While there are movements across the United States to create programs for
alcohol awareness and prevention of underage drinking on college campuses,183
sexual assault involving intoxication by both parties remains omnipresent.184 The

171. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160; Wechsler,
supra note 170, at 228.
172. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 161.
173. Antonia Abbey, et al., Alcohol and Sexual Assault, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND
ALCOHOLISM, available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh25-1/43-51.htm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
174. SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUSES: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. 2 (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
175. Sexual Violence on College Campuses, EMORY UNIVERSITY, OFFICE OF HEATH PROMOTION (Nov.
14, 2015), available at http://studenthealth.emory.edu/hp/respect_program/sexual_violence_on_college
_campuses.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
176. Id.
177. Abbey et al., supra note 173.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 199.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Beth Howard, How Colleges Are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 28,
2015), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-battling-sexual-violence
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
184. Amanda Hess, How Drunk Is Too Drunk To Have Sex?, SLATE, http://www.slate.com/articles/
double_x/doublex/2015/02/drunk_sex_on_campus_universities_are_struggling_to_determine_when_intoxicate
d.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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law should accommodate this now all-too-familiar occurrence. An accused
offender should not be disadvantaged under the law because he was intoxicated
when the alleged victim may have been in an equal or enhanced intoxicated
condition. Under the 1962 MPC, however, that is regrettably the case.185
Adopting the proposed changes to the MPC would concede that mutually
intoxicated sexual assault frequently occurs, that it occurs among a staggering
number of the nation’s young adults, much like alcoholism affects a staggering
number of adults,186 and that the law should accommodate the situation so that
the intoxicated condition of both parties is legally relevant.187
Adopting the draft could result in fewer convictions of men who commit
sexual assault by claiming they were intoxicated and, thus, did not have the
requisite mens rea for the offense.188 While it is possible that an offender may
escape conviction the first time, the likelihood that a repeat offender could deny
awareness of the risk of becoming intoxicated more than once is incredibly
low.189
If John, for the first time, set out to get Jane drunk in order to have sex with
her, he may be able to claim he was unaware of the risk in getting drunk and
unaware that it would cause him to engage in improper sexual behavior.190 He
may be acquitted if able to prove this.191 Yet, it would still be difficult to prove
unawareness because the prosecutor could introduce evidence of the offender’s
behavior through witness testimony.192 Therefore, the risk of a first-time offender
using alcohol as an excuse remains moderately low.193
However, if acquitted and he then intentionally gets Sally drunk and has sex
with her, a judge and jury would surely be unconvinced that he was unaware yet
again of the risk in getting drunk.194 Thus, he would only be able to use his
intoxication as a defense once, at most.195

185. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
186. See Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM (Jan. 4, 2016),
available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-facts-and-statistics
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the statistics of alcoholism in the United
States, and stating that 16.6 million adults ages 18 and over have Alcohol Use Disorders, AUDs).
187. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 213.5 cmt. at 189 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
188. Id. at 190.
189. See generally id. (discussing the proof required to show an actor’s unawareness).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. (discussing the ability for prosecutors to introduce evidence regarding an accused’s
intoxicated state, as well as any clear indicators of consent or lack thereof).
194. See id. (describing the persuasive evidence that might convince a jury of an accused’s awareness).
195. Cf. id. (explaining the factors that would be indicative of an accused’s awareness, which if were
presented along with a prior accusation of sexual assault, would likely lead the jury to conclude the accused was
aware of the risk of potential harm).
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b. Effects of Alcohol on Mental Processes
The 1962 MPC commentary acknowledges that nearly everyone knows the
consequences of excessive drinking on human behavior.196 It notes however, that
a problem arises “when the actor’s intoxication is adduced to disprove an element
of the offense with which he is charged and is relevant to do so, but when its
admissibility for such purpose has been restricted by the law.”197 The 1962 MPC
comment authors later attempted to argue why there is no problem by pinpointing
the precise issue of disallowing evidence of an accused’s intoxication for crimes
with a mens rea of recklessness.198
The effects of alcohol on behavior and mental processes is highlighted in a
footnote to a paragraph, which states the issue with disallowing evidence of an
accused’s intoxicated state.199 “As a matter of logic, the fact of acute alcoholic
intoxication may be ground an inference that the actor did not act with
knowledge or purpose or recklessness required as an element of the crime.”200
Because alcohol is a depressant, it can alter a person’s “perceptive capacity and
mental powers.”201
This statement is not conjecture but is grounded in science.202 The CDC lists
the effects of alcohol on the human body at various blood alcohol
concentrations.203 For example, John from the above hypothetical is a male who
engaged in binge drinking—therefore according to NIAAA statistics, he may
have consumed five drinks in two hours.204 If John consumed five drinks in two
hours, under the CDC standards, he would have had a blood alcohol
concentration at 0.10 percent.205 At 0.10 percent, John would suffer from
deterioration of reaction time and control, slowed thinking, slurred speech, and
poor coordination.206 After only five drinks, presumably less than he actually
consumed due to his description of the night, his mental processes were
altered.207 If John was not comatose or vomiting, his BAC could have been
196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 359 (1985).
197. Id. at 352.
198. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. at 352 n.7 (1985) (discussing why it is not an issue to disallow
evidence of intoxication for crimes with a mens rea of recklessness).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC
EFFECTS (May 13, 2016), available at http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaireddrv_factsheet.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the effects of alcohol on
the body at various blood alcohol concentrations).
203. Id.
204. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160.
205. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC EFFECTS,
supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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around 0.20 percent.208 At 0.20 percent, John would feel dazed, confused, or
disoriented.209 He would need help standing or walking, and would likely
experience a blackout.210
The ALI draft has not fully developed the issue of how intoxicated an actor
must be in order to use evidence of his intoxicated state to rebut his
recklessness.211 A person passing in and out of consciousness would meet the
requirement, but whether anything less than that would suffice is unclear.212
Would a 0.10 percent BAC resulting in an alteration of mental processes be
enough for John to rebut his recklessness? Or would John’s BAC need to be
higher, say at 0.20 percent where he is likely experiencing a blackout? The
tentative draft left this unanswered.
Jane, a binge-drinking female, according to NIAAA statistics, may have
consumed four drinks in two hours.213 If Jane consumed four drinks in two hours,
under the CDC’s standards, she would have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08
percent.214 At 0.08 percent, Jane’s muscle coordination would have been poor,
her judgment would have been impaired, her self-control would have been
impaired, and her reasoning and memory would have been impaired.215 After
only four drinks, presumably less than she actually drank according to her to
recount of events that night, her mental processes would have been
compromised.216 Similar to John, if Jane was not comatose or vomiting, it is
possible she had a BAC of 0.20 percent.217 If Jane had a BAC of 0.20 percent,
she would suffer from confusion, disorientation, inability to stand or walk, and a
blackout.218
The ALI also does not fully develop the issue of how intoxicated a
participant must be in order to be considered incapacitated and, thus, incapable of
consent.219 The ALI notes the challenges in drawing the line of incapacitation,
including that intoxication causes different effects and not every person is
affected equally by the same amount of alcohol.220 Therefore, even if a specific
BAC level were adopted, such as 0.10 or 0.20, there would be no definitive

208. Effects At Specific B.A.C. Levels, B.R.A.D. 21, available at http://www.brad21.org/effects_at_
specific_bac.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 cmt. at 190 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 52015).
212. Id. at 90.
213. College Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM, supra note 160.
214. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC EFFECTS,
supra note 203.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. B.R.A.D. 21, supra note 208.
218. Id.
219. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. at 90 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
220. Id.
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answer based on the BAC level alone as to how the level actually affected the
victim during the event at issue; especially if the offender’s BAC was not
measured immediately after the alleged assault occurred.221
Even by a modest estimate of the amount of alcohol that Jane and John
consumed on the night of their sexual encounter, both parties certainly had
altered mental and physical processes.222 If they both had higher levels of BAC,
then each could have experienced a blackout.223 Yet, under current law, John
cannot introduce his intoxicated mental state to rebut the presumption that he
consciously disregarded the risk of sexual assault, while Jane can state that her
intoxication rendered her incapable of consent.224
Adopting the proposed changes would align science with law.225 Studies
show that at five drinks, John is mentally impaired,226 but the law states that he
was consciously aware regardless of that evidence.227 While the ALI has not
resolved the issues concerning the level of intoxication required for both parties,
the proposed draft focuses on two inquiries: (1) “whether the degree of
intoxication was so extreme as to effectively preclude the expression of
unwillingness”228 on the part of the victim; and (2) whether the actor knew (or
recklessly disregarded) that the other party was intoxicated to that degree.229 Both
inquiries permit either party to introduce extrinsic evidence of intoxication.230
The proposed changes would allow John to argue the physical and physiological
effects of his level of intoxication in order to disprove the mens rea by allowing
evidence relevant to his recklessness, as is allowed for purpose and knowledge.231
Consciousness could then be altered through intoxication in the eyes of the law
as it is altered through intoxication in the eyes of science.
3. Elimination of Gender-Biased Protection
As mentioned in Part II.C.,232 the tentative draft retains the protection for
voluntarily intoxicated victims.233 The most basic reason for this is that each

221. Id.
222. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC EFFECTS,
supra note 202.
223. B.R.A.D. 21, supra note 208.
224. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
225. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC
EFFECTS, supra note 203 (science indicates that someone like John was mentally impaired).
226. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, IMPAIRED DRIVING: GET THE FACTS, BAC EFFECTS,
supra note 202.
227. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985).
228. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. at 91 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
229. Id.
230. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.0(4) cmt. at 91 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 9 2015).
231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. at 91 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
232. Supra Part II.C.
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individual has a right to autonomous choice, including whether to drink or to
engage in sexual activity.234 However, one idea in American culture is that if you
allow yourself to drink to the point of blacking out or passing out, then you are
“inviting inappropriate conduct upon yourself.”235 This cultural idea has spread to
juries, causing them to believe a voluntarily intoxicated victim was either
partially or fully responsible for his or her sexual assault.236
The phenomenon of victim blaming may be explained through various
stigma.237 One stigma is that women who voluntarily consume alcohol are more
sexually promiscuous.238 Men then interpret their sexual promiscuity as consent
to sexual activity.239 The stigma may also be the result of a voluntarily
intoxicated victim failing to conform to societal gender norms.240 Alcohol
intoxication is traditionally viewed as a male activity in which women should not
participate.241 If they do, they contradict the gender norm and are judged more
severely than if men engage in the behavior.242
The stigmas surrounding women and voluntary intoxication show that
women are susceptible to sexual assault in situations involving alcohol and why
the law should provide full protection for victims like Jane.243 According to
current law, Jane has done nothing culpable by getting drunk.244 Yet, if Jane
simply engaged in voluntary intoxication, which the law says is not criminal,
why should John be at fault for the very same conduct?
The simple answer is that he should not. If restricted to the facts of John and
Jane’s case, then there is no other theory of culpability other than John’s choice
to become intoxicated.245 He did not have the requisite mens rea prior to the
offense by getting Jane drunk in order to have sex with her, and he was not aware
that his drinking would result in harmful sexual conduct.246 Therefore, the only
distinction between the victim and the accused is gender.

233. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. at 86 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015).
234. Id. at 86.
235. Maggie Tennis, Rape and the Intoxicated Victim, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.
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Consider what happens if a man claims that a woman engaged in unwanted
sexual behavior.247 Although rape is the least reported of all violent crimes,248 the
claim that male victimization is uncommon is faulty.249 The minimization of male
victimization occurs because of underreporting and scant legal action concerning
male victims.250 The causes of underreporting include: the emphasis placed on
female victimization, the notion that females are more vulnerable to sexual
assault, the belief that men are unlikely victims that perpetuates an expectation of
masculinity on men, and the portrayal of male victimization as harmless.251 This
preexisting male discourse creates obstacles for victimized males, including the
notion that “real men” can protect themselves and aroused men want the sexual
encounter.252
The discourse harms males victimized by both women and by men.253
Additionally, victimized homosexual men are accused of “ask[ing] for it.”254 The
traditional paradigm that women are sexual victims and males are invincible
downplays male victimization.255 Perpetuating the concept of “masculinized
dominance and feminized subordination” hinders understanding of sexual
victimization of all people.256 The fact is, despite underreporting, sexual assault
occurs across both genders.257
Therefore, because sexual assault involving intoxication of both offenders is
so prevalent and because sexual assault is gender-neutral, the law should reflect
an unbiased treatment of offenders.258 The proposed draft eliminates this
disparate treatment by allowing both parties to introduce evidence of their
intoxication, which permits the jury to analyze the actual mental processes of the
parties to determine who is culpable.259 Thus, instead of the jury convicting based
on traditional sexual biases, the focus in mutually intoxicated sexual assaults is
whether the offender had a culpable mindset despite the intoxication, a fact
which is influenced by science not prejudice.260
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Consequently, John would have the opportunity to present evidence that he
was unaware of the risk of getting drunk and unaware that the risk of getting
drunk would result in harmful sexual activity.261 Or if the facts were reversed,
and John claimed Jane sexually assaulted him, Jane would have the opportunity
to present evidence that she was unaware of the risk of getting drunk and
unaware that the risk of getting drunk would result in harmful sexual activity.262
If the jury believes the evidence, then either party could be acquitted of the
criminal charges.263
4. Remaining Questions
With the promise of advancements, the proposed draft raises many questions.
First, why should a sexual aggressor who deliberately becomes drunk in order to
claim lack of awareness be able to use intoxication as a defense? While this is a
legitimate concern, assume that the prosecutor discovered that John routinely
gets drunk with his fraternity friends in order to sexually assault females like
Jane. Even if John were calculated enough to do so, a prosecutor would likely be
able to contradict his lack of awareness. If the law allows John to make the claim
once that he lacked awareness of the risk that drinking alcohol would lead to
sexual aggression, then he would have, at most, one opportunity to claim that he
was unaware of the effects of alcohol.
This leads to a second question: why should the offender be able to use the
defense even once? There is no debate that allowing even one sexual assault to
go unprosecuted is unacceptable. While there is a risk that a sexual aggressor
could use the defense once, the decision remains in hands of the jury to
determine whether the evidence surrounding the offender’s intoxication supports
the defense.264 The proposed change only allows the evidence of intoxication to
be introduced and considered; it does not create a presumptive conclusion that
the offender was unaware of the risk in becoming intoxicated simply because he
claims it.265 Consequently, the sexual assault will still be prosecuted if the
evidence does not support the offender’s claim.266
Another concern mentioned in the 1962 MPC commentary is how a
prosecutor can secure a conviction.267 In a case involving the mens rea of purpose
or knowledge, a prosecutor often has evidence to rebut a defendant’s claim that
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he did not have purpose or knowledge. 268 For example, if the state must prove
that an offender knowingly sold stolen property and the offender claims he did
not know the goods were stolen, the prosecutor may be able to rebut the
offender’s claim with evidence that the offender paid far less than market value
for the property.269
Similarly, in the intoxication context, a prosecutor may be able to rebut what
the accused claims his mental state was at the time of the crime with witnesses
who observed his behavior. Witnesses could support evidence that the accused
did not seem particularly intoxicated or that he spoke clearly after the crime.270
While some of the concerns surrounding the proposed draft can be answered
and alleviated, other moral questions remain. The 1962 MPC commentary stated
that becoming severely intoxicated has little, if no, social value.271 By changing
the law of intoxication, is the proposed draft in essence stating that becoming
severely intoxicated now has social value? In addition, by legally acknowledging
that mutually intoxicated sexual acts occur so frequently, is the proposed draft
condoning this behavior? Are intoxicated offenders who commit sexual assault
gaining more leniency than they should be? Lastly, should the law adapt to
changing social attitudes towards intoxication in the same way it adapted to
same-sex marriage and other social movements?
The response to all of those questions is simple: the goal of the proposed
draft and the potential new law is to reserve the criminal law for culpable
conduct.272 If that culpable conduct includes copious alcohol consumption and
sexual activity that occurs between mutually intoxicated parties, then the criminal
law should respond to those activities.273 As far as leniency for intoxicated
offenders who commit sexual assault, the choice to convict or acquit those
offenders remains in the hands of the jury.274 The proposed draft changes what
evidence is permitted, but not the burden of proof required for conviction.275
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Therefore, the decision to be lenient or not remains with the same people and
within the same parameters.276
One pivotal legal question lingers under the current proposed draft: how
intoxicated must an offender be to negate his mens rea? Can John negate his
mens rea with a 0.10 blood alcohol concentration after five drinks? Again, the
answer lies in his culpability. If his intoxicated conduct was culpable, then he
may not negate his mens rea; but if his intoxicated conduct was not culpable,
then he may negate his mens rea.277 On balance, the possible results of the
proposed changes are more optimistic than problematic.278
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed changes to the MPC aim to navigate the law away from the
rigid confines of the traditional approach to intoxication and calibrate it to
address the contemporary issues involving intoxication across the United
States.279 The proposed draft has the potential to: restore the uniformity of
culpability proportionate to liability in nearly all provisions of the MPC; place
mutually intoxicated parties on an even keel when a sexual assault is alleged; and
permit science and behavior to inform whether an individual was aware and
consciously disregarded a risk in getting drunk and engaging in harmful sexual
behavior.280
Only time and adopting these changes will definitively address the plethora
of remaining moral and legal questions. Until then, thousands of other college
students accused of assault, like John, are unable to produce evidence of their
intoxication in court, despite the fact that the alleged victim was equally
intoxicated and heavy drinking is “a normal part of college life.”281
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